Skip to main content

2 posts tagged with "crypto"

View all tags

CZ's 'Freedom of Money': from a Jiangsu Boy to a Crypto Empire - Chapter-by-Chapter Summary

· 39 min read
Tian Pan
Software Engineer

On April 8, 2026, Changpeng Zhao’s (CZ) autobiography, Freedom of Money: A Memoir on Luck, Resilience, and Protecting Users, officially hit the shelves. Spanning 364 pages and roughly 110,000 words, it immediately claimed the number one spot for new releases in Amazon's cryptocurrency category. Most of the book's first draft was written in 2024 while he was serving time in a U.S. federal prison—using public computers in 15-minute increments. All royalties are being donated to charity.

This is not a traditional "how to succeed in business" book. It reads more like the reflections of a man who spent seven years in the eye of a hurricane and finally sat down to tell the whole story at his own pace. Below is a chapter-by-chapter breakdown of the 25 chapters and the appendix.

Part I: The Origins (Chapters 1–4)

The book intentionally opens with CZ's childhood. He doesn't start with the glory of Binance, nor does he lead with the drama of his imprisonment. Instead, he begins in a school dorm without running water. These four chapters lay down the psychological bedrock for every major decision he makes later in life.

Chapter 1: A Boy from Jiangsu

CZ was born in 1977 into a family of intellectuals in Lianyungang, Jiangsu Province. His father, Shengkai Zhao, was a geophysics professor at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC)—though the title of "professor" carried heavy historical baggage. During political movements, Shengkai was branded a "pro-capitalist intellectual" and temporarily exiled to the countryside. CZ's mother also taught at a university. The family lived in campus housing with dirt floors and no running water.

CZ recalls this childhood as "carefree." Growing up on the campuses of elementary schools, middle schools, and USTC, the school grounds were his playground. When he was 10, the family moved to Hefei, where CZ began interacting with older USTC students. They discussed philosophy, played chess, and debated—an intellectual atmosphere that left a profound impact on him. Though socially awkward, his father was his first technical mentor. A colleague once described Shengkai Zhao as "brilliant but far too modest; he never commercialized his own inventions."

The core takeaway from this chapter is that poverty does not equal misery. CZ purposefully places this era at the beginning of the book to set the tone and to show that he is no stranger to "scarcity." This foundational experience colored all of his later perspectives on money and freedom. Tragically, Shengkai Zhao later died of leukemia. In the book, CZ reflects on how his father spent all his time in labs and at computers, never attending CZ's volleyball games: "I was the team captain, playing twice a week, and my parents never came to watch." He expresses a deep-seated fear of repeating that exact pattern with his own children.

Chapter 2: The Vancouver Years

On August 6, 1989, 12-year-old CZ and his mother arrived in Vancouver to reunite with his father, who had gone to Canada five years earlier to pursue a Ph.D. in geophysics at the University of British Columbia (UBC). The family lived in graduate student housing, and their financial situation plummeted. Unable to continue teaching due to the language barrier, his mother took piece-rate work at a garment factory, a grueling job that permanently damaged her health. His father commuted in a beat-up Datsun.

This stood in stark contrast to many of CZ's classmates, who were wealthy immigrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan, wearing designer clothes and driving sports cars. CZ would hitch rides to his volleyball games (where he was, again, the team captain) twice a week in a friend’s BMW, only to return to his own modest apartment.

A teenage CZ worked overnight shifts at a Chevron gas station and spent two full years flipping burgers at McDonald's. He has never hidden this part of his life; even as a billionaire, when asked about his first job, he proudly answers, "McDonald's." This period directly forged the "extreme frugality" culture he later brought to Binance, which famously didn't even have a physical office in its early days.

However, there was one life-altering "luxury" during this time: his father spent around CAD 7,000 on an IBM-compatible 286 PC. It was an astronomical sum back then. His father used it for research and also used it to teach CZ how to code. That computer became the launchpad for CZ’s life in tech.

Chapter 3: Wall Street and Tokyo

After finishing high school in 1995, CZ traveled 3,000 miles to Montreal to attend McGill University. He initially studied biology but quickly realized, "University biology was just back to animals—I wasn't interested." He pivoted to computer science. His college life wasn't particularly glamorous; he spent his free time between ice rinks, Vietnamese pho restaurants, and the Mac labs.

The real turning point wasn't a class, but a book. In his junior year, CZ read Robert Kiyosaki's Rich Dad Poor Dad, which completely shattered the "study hard, get a good job" mentality his parents had instilled in him. "After reading it, I started thinking maybe I should own my own business—build an operation that meant something."

In his senior year, he co-authored an AI paper with Professor Jeremy Cooperstock (who later recalled CZ as "smart," though he never imagined the student would become a billionaire). During a summer internship in 2000, he developed order-matching systems for the Tokyo Stock Exchange. He landed a full-time offer and never went back to finish his degree. Contrary to media reports stating he "graduated from McGill," CZ frankly admits in the book that he dropped out.

He then joined Bloomberg Tradebook in New York, developing futures trading software. He was relocated three times in two years—New Jersey, London, Tokyo—managing teams across different regions. By 25, he was making $390,000 a year and managing 60 people. But he grew restless. In 2005, he quit, moved to Shanghai, and co-founded Fusion Systems with four expat partners—a SaaS company building high-frequency trading systems for investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Credit Suisse.

His time in Shanghai taught him two things: first, to "think like a salesman," and second, that business rules in China were "deliberately ambiguous," leaving massive discretionary power to government enforcement. He particularly disliked the "banquet drinking culture" where business relationships were forged over shots of Baijiu. "That stuff was alien to me, so I never really liked it."

Chapter 4: The Bitcoin Epiphany

A poker game in 2013 changed everything. A friend from Sequoia Capital and another investor, Daying Cao, both mentioned Bitcoin to CZ. Having heard the term three times in quick succession, he finally decided to look into it. Once he did, he made a decision that seemed insane at the time: he sold his apartment in Shanghai and went all-in, buying about $1 million worth of Bitcoin.

Within two months, Bitcoin crashed by 70%, leaving him with a paper loss of over $700,000. Meanwhile, Shanghai real estate prices continued to skyrocket. All his friends mocked his decision. But CZ held on.

He first rooted himself in the industry by joining Blockchain.info (now Blockchain.com) as Head of Development. That same year, he met a 19-year-old Vitalik Buterin. Their friendship deepened in a rather unusual way—Vitalik later stayed at CZ’s house, sleeping in a bunk bed in CZ's son's room, and explaining the concept of smart contracts to the kid.

When Ethereum launched in 2015, CZ had the chance to invest but hesitated: "I was skeptical about whether implementing complex logic on a blockchain using a Turing-complete language was feasible." Ethereum eventually surged thousands of times over. But their friendship endures to this day—"Just this morning, Vitalik and I were discussing biotech investment opportunities," he notes.

This chapter also includes a near-miss that could have altered crypto history: in early 2014, CZ was invited to be the CEO of Mt. Gox’s China division, complete with a 10% equity stake and financial backing from Susquehanna. He was seriously considering it and was about to sign—but then Mt. Gox collapsed on February 7, 2014. CZ lost 100 Bitcoins stored on the platform in the fallout (about 50,000then;roughly50,000 then; roughly 7 million today), but he never even tried to recover them.

Part II: Building the Empire (Chapters 5–8)

All the foundational elements laid out in the first four chapters—his father’s technical DNA, the immigrant hunger, Wall Street’s systems thinking, his dissatisfaction with traditional finance—converge here. It took just 180 days to go from a hotpot dinner in Chengdu to becoming the world's largest crypto exchange.

Chapter 5: The Birth of Binance

The story starts at a hotpot dinner in Chengdu on June 14, 2017. At the table, CZ met old friends, including Roger Ver, and the conversation turned to the red-hot ICO (Initial Coin Offering) market. After dinner, he went back to his team and announced, "We are doing an ICO, too." Within three days, Binance’s whitepaper was written—from learning the concept of an ICO to the final draft.

The project almost launched under a different name. The original Chinese name CZ picked was vetoed by He Yi in a single sentence: "Your name sounds like a grocery store." She suggested "Binance" (a portmanteau of Binary and Finance). CZ admits in the book that asking for her opinion on the name was a "little trick"—his real goal was to recruit her. She verbally agreed to join the night before launch, on July 13, 2017.

On July 14, Binance officially launched. The two-week ICO had taken place over five rounds, with each round selling out in seconds, raising a total of $15 million.

CZ had spent four years accumulating experience in the crypto industry: Head of Development at Blockchain.info, founding Bijie Tech (which provided trading platforms for 30 Chinese exchanges), and serving as CTO of OKCoin (an experience that would turn into one of the industry's biggest feuds, detailed in Chapter 22). Binance’s founding team was tiny—just a few friends scraping together. No fancy offices, no complex corporate structures.

CZ highlights three core strategies that made Binance stand out: supporting ERC-20 tokens (when other exchanges only had Bitcoin trading pairs), a commitment to customer service with a one-day response time (competitors took months; Binance later cut this to five minutes), and proactively compensating users during the "September 4th" regulatory crackdown in China.

Chapter 6: Blitzscaling

Binance’s growth is legendary in the crypto space. Within six months of launching, powered by an engine capable of processing 1.4 million transactions per second, it attracted 6 million users and became the largest crypto exchange globally. From September to December 2017, Bitcoin shot from 3,000to3,000 to 20,000, and Binance caught the perfect tailwind. At the peak of the 2021 bull run, daily trading volume exceeded 76billion.ForbesestimatedCZsnetworthbrieflyhit76 billion. Forbes estimated CZ’s net worth briefly hit 96 billion.

But in the middle of this legend was a near-death experience—China’s blanket ban on cryptocurrencies on September 4, 2017.

The night before the ban dropped, CZ received a tip that a "massive crackdown was coming." He called an emergency meeting and decided to fly to Tokyo with He Yi that very night. He Yi suggested he take out his SIM card and turn off his phone—an idea inspired by a spy movie, though she later admitted she had no idea if it actually prevented tracking.

At the time, BNB’s price was already 6x its ICO price, so nobody wanted a refund. However, four other ICO projects facilitated on Binance had fallen below their issue price, and those project teams didn't have the reserves to make users whole. The shortfall was roughly 6million.DuringaphonecallwhileCZwasonamovingtrain,theteamreachedaconsensusinjust10minutes:Binancewoulduseitsowncashreservestomakethoseuserswholeonbehalfoftheprojectteams.That6 million. During a phone call while CZ was on a moving train, the team reached a consensus in just 10 minutes: **Binance would use its own cash reserves to make those users whole on behalf of the project teams.** That 6 million represented 40% of the company’s total assets at the time.

CZ frankly admits the role of "luck" in this chapter, but stresses that luck favors the prepared. It was his technical team's 20 years of accumulated expertise, hyper-sensitivity to user needs, and a "fast-decision" management style that allowed Binance to seize the window. He notes that many critical product decisions were made in hours, not weeks. Going from zero to number one globally in 180 days—this speed has been cited in countless business school case studies since.

Chapter 7: The Headquarterless Company

After evacuating Shanghai, Binance began its unique "headless" operational model. CZ went to Tokyo, then Taipei, Singapore, Malta—wherever there was a need, wherever regulations were friendly. Eventually, employees were spread across dozens of countries, with over 10,000 people working fully remotely. CZ himself was a nomad for years, with no fixed home.

In July 2018, CZ showed up to an industry conference in Taipei wearing shorts and flip-flops to meet with Taiwanese legislator Jason Hsu. What was supposed to be a closed-door meeting was spontaneously turned into a livestream by the two of them. Hsu later remarked, "He’s a straight-shooting, no-BS entrepreneur." That image—shorts, flip-flops, a lawmaker, a livestream—perfectly encapsulated Binance’s early culture: anti-traditional, informal, and fiercely pragmatic.

CZ called this model "decentralized management," perfectly aligning with the philosophy of crypto itself. His core belief regarding regulation was: "Rather than trying to change rules to circumvent them, it's better to find friendlier jurisdictions." But he also acknowledges the massive compliance nightmares this created. Having no clear legal jurisdiction meant that regulatory agencies from every country could come knocking. The UK's FCA banned Binance’s regulated activities in 2021; France, Japan, Germany, and Italy followed suit with their own actions. This flexibility was Binance’s greatest strength, and eventually, its Achilles' heel.

Chapter 8: The Ecosystem Empire

Binance was never just an exchange. This chapter chronicles the build-out of the ecosystem: BNB, Binance Smart Chain (BSC), Binance Labs, Trust Wallet, and Binance Academy. CZ’s core strategy was to "build moats outside the exchange"—so if the exchange ever stopped being profitable, the ecosystem would survive.

The chapter also reveals a story about "resisting temptation." A project team once tried to personally bribe CZ with a $20 million "listing fee" to get their coin on Binance. CZ refused and blacklisted them. This incident led him to draft the "Binance Listing Guidelines," mandating that all applications go through the official website and creating an airtight "physical isolation" between the listing team and the project founders to prevent under-the-table dealing.

One key investment decision highlighted was a 3millionbetonTerra/LUNAinearly2018.Atitspeak,thisinvestmentskyrocketedto3 million bet on Terra/LUNA in early 2018. At its peak, this investment skyrocketed to 1.6 billion in value. But Terra’s collapse cost Binance dearly. CZ outlines three reasons why he chose not to sell before the crash: to maintain market confidence, to prevent massive liquidations from causing a wider panic, and to ensure no one could accuse Binance of "front-running retail investors." "If Binance, as the largest holder, dumped first, the market panic would have been catastrophic, and retail users would have been hurt the most." Whether that decision was right is up for debate, but it underscores his oft-repeated principle of "protecting users."

Part III: The Storm (Chapters 9–12)

If the first two parts trace an upward arc—from poverty to a global empire—Part III is the steep plunge. The 2022 crypto winter, the collapse of FTX, and the DOJ investigation: these four chapters cover the darkest 18 months of CZ’s life. This is the emotional center of the book, exploring how a person maintains rationality while losing control.

Chapter 9: Eve of the Storm

2022 was the crypto industry’s "darkest hour," and CZ uses this chapter to reconstruct the timeline of the contagion from an insider's perspective.

In May, Terra’s algorithmic stablecoin UST de-pegged, wiping out 40billioninmarketcapasLUNAcrashed99.9940 billion in market cap as LUNA crashed 99.99%. Binance’s 1.6 billion position effectively went to zero. On June 12, crypto lender Celsius froze withdrawals; on June 27, hedge fund Three Arrows Capital (3AC) defaulted on loans to Celsius and Voyager, entering liquidation. On July 13, Celsius officially filed for bankruptcy. The dominos were falling one by one, dragging Bitcoin from 47,000downto47,000 down to 16,000.

CZ reveals for the first time the existence of a private Signal group called "Exchange Collaboration," created by former FTX employee Zane Tackett after the Terra crash. Members included CZ, SBF (Sam Bankman-Fried), Coinbase CEO Brian Armstrong, and other industry heavyweights. The intent was to coordinate crisis response, but it later drew the scrutiny of U.S. authorities—because to some, private coordination among competitors looks like collusion.

CZ admits this period made him realize that the "systemic risk" in crypto was far worse than he had imagined. A single project’s failure could cascade through lending chains and infect the entire industry. This is the context behind his later intervention in the FTX crisis—he wasn't trying to save SBF; he was trying to stop the next domino from falling.

Chapter 10: FTX and SBF

This is one of the most highly anticipated chapters. CZ details the evolution of his relationship with SBF—from investor to rival, and finally, to "firefighter."

CZ first met SBF at Binance Blockchain Week in January 2019. While Binance’s CFO was bullish on FTX, CZ and He Yi initially passed on investing. By November 2019, CZ changed his mind and agreed to swap BNB for FTT, eventually taking about a 20% stake in FTX.

But once the ink dried, SBF "immediately changed his tune." He poached Binance’s VIP account managers offering 5x salaries, stole the entire VIP client roster, publicly trashed Binance in D.C., and pitched FTX to U.S. regulators as the "compliant alternative."

In November 2022, facing a bank run, SBF sent his first message to CZ: "Has our relationship degraded to the point where we can't even talk?" On the ensuing call, SBF asked for billions in emergency funding. CZ writes that SBF’s tone "was like he was ordering a bologna sandwich"—completely disconnected from the magnitude of the cash he was requesting.

Alameda CEO Caroline Ellison publicly offered to buy Binance’s FTT at 22atokenwhichCZcallsa"fatalmistake,"becauseitsignaledtotheentiremarketexactlywhereherfloorwas.Themarketreactedbrutally:FTTdroppedto22 a token—which CZ calls a "fatal mistake," because it signaled to the entire market exactly where her floor was. The market reacted brutally: FTT dropped to 15, then 10,andfinally10, and finally 5. Within 72 hours, $6 billion fled FTX.

"I didn't want FTX, and I didn't want to help SBF," CZ writes. "But to protect users and the broader industry, I had to step in." Binance signed a non-binding Letter of Intent to acquire FTX on November 8, but backed out just one day later after looking at the books. CZ clarifies that it was never a genuine acquisition attempt, but rather a play to stabilize market confidence and buy users time to withdraw their funds.

Chapter 11: The Department of Justice

In 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) launched a sweeping investigation into Binance. The core charge wasn't fraud; it was violations of the Bank Secrecy Act's anti-money laundering (AML) provisions. Court documents exposed embarrassing internal chats—one employee wrote, "Operating in the US, it's better to ask for forgiveness than permission." Another sarcastically summarized the culture: "Money laundering is too hard? Come to Binance, we have cake." Filings also showed Binance processing transactions linked to the Hydra darknet market and Hamas.

CZ frankly admits that Binance’s explosive growth had indeed "left unavoidable holes in our compliance systems."

This chapter explains why the U.S. government could crack down on a company that didn't physically operate in the U.S.—the answer: if you serve American users, you fall under American jurisdiction. Ultimately, Binance agreed to pay 7.2billioninfinestotheDOJ,Treasury,andCFTC(7.2 billion in fines to the DOJ, Treasury, and CFTC (4.3 billion from the company, $1.5 billion personally from CZ). CZ stepped down as CEO, handing the reins to Richard Teng. CZ describes this as "sacrificing a pawn to save the chariot"—falling on his sword to protect the company and its users.

Chapter 12: Awaiting Sentencing

The five months between his guilty plea on November 21, 2023, and his sentencing on April 30, 2024, were the most agonizing period CZ describes. Prosecutors pushed for a three-year sentence. The psychological weight of the unknown was worse than the prison itself—he didn't know how long he would serve, whether he’d be deported, or if his three young children would grow up while he was locked away.

His legal team gathered 161 letters of support from family, business partners, and industry peers, highlighting his character and dedication as a father. Ultimately, Judge Richard Jones sentenced him to four months—far below the three years the prosecution wanted. The judge noted CZ’s willingness to "take responsibility for his mistakes" rather than viewing his actions as intentionally malicious.

The writing here is highly introspective, reading almost like a diary. CZ describes his daily routine during the wait: reading voraciously—from history to philosophy to business biographies—searching for anchors in the stories of others. He began re-evaluating his life’s priorities: health, family, and freedom first; career and wealth second. For a man who had prioritized work above all else, this was a fundamental rewiring.

He shares a poignant detail: during the wait, he and He Yi discussed what they would do if he got three years. She told him she would bring the kids to visit every month while continuing to run Binance. "She said it so calmly," CZ writes, "as if it were just another operational issue to solve." Her composure brought him both comfort and deep guilt.

Part IV: Behind Bars and Rebirth (Chapters 13–17)

From the top of the global billionaires list to Inmate #88087-510—these five chapters document the most dramatic identity shift of CZ’s life. Yet, the narrative is surprisingly calm. There is no self-pity, no bitterness; only the reflections of a man forced to slow down. This is also where the book's first draft was born—on public computers, 15 minutes at a time.

Chapter 13: Life Behind Bars

On June 1, 2024, CZ surrendered to FCI Lompoc II, a low-security federal prison in California, as "Inmate 88087-510." Because he wasn't a U.S. citizen, he was ineligible for minimum-security camps (which offer more freedom). This is the most personal chapter in the book.

The prison operated on its own micro-economy: inmates were allowed to spend $180 every two weeks and worked on the adjacent farm—planting, tending cattle, raising horses. CZ lost 6 kilograms but found his physical fitness actually improved through daily exercise. He caught a cold three or four times, relying entirely on over-the-counter meds, as medical attention was only granted if you were severely ill.

The first draft of this very book was written here. The prison computers were rudimentary—CZ likened them to "electronic typewriters" with no copy-paste function, and he was restricted to 15-minute sessions. Under these conditions, he painstakingly typed out 110,000 words.

"The mental toll of uncertainty is far heavier than any physical discomfort," he writes. He notes his biggest epiphany in prison was realizing that "family and health are vastly more important than work"—no small realization for an entrepreneur who spent his life grinding 24/7 across the globe. Notably, even behind bars, CZ retained about 90% ownership of Binance, with a net worth around $60.6 billion, making him one of the wealthiest inmates in U.S. history.

Chapter 14: The ICE Ordeal

After serving about three months at Lompoc, CZ was transferred in late August 2024 to a halfway house in San Pedro, California. He gained more freedom—allowed out under supervision, even catching a movie.

But this phase wasn’t peaceful. As a non-U.S. citizen, he faced an added legal hurdle: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). He details the bureaucratic maze surrounding his immigration status—would he be immediately deported upon release? What would happen to his visa? These unresolved questions threw his release date into limbo and turned what should have been a "transition" into a highly stressful ordeal.

While at the halfway house, CZ did something fascinating: he volunteered to write cryptocurrency educational materials for his fellow inmates, largely pulling from Binance Academy's open-source curriculum. The founder of the world's biggest crypto exchange, imprisoned for AML violations, teaching other inmates what crypto is—it’s a scenario ripe for a short story.

Chapter 15: Freedom

CZ was released two days early on September 27, 2024, as his scheduled release date (Sept 29) fell on a weekend, a standard practice in the federal prison system.

The tone here is serene rather than euphoric. CZ notes that the first thing he did upon release wasn't holding a press conference; it was sitting quietly with his family. He emphasizes that "time and freedom" are the two most precious things in life—far more valuable than money.

He describes the "re-acclimation" process: when handed back his smartphone, he found himself in no rush to check notifications. Four months of a forced "digital detox" had permanently altered his relationship with information. He no longer felt the need to be plugged in 24/7. He consciously minimized screen time, reserving his hours for face-to-face interactions and the outdoors.

His first public appearance post-prison was on October 31, 2024, at Binance Blockchain Week in Dubai. As he walked onto the stage, the crowd gave him a standing ovation. It was a stark contrast to his walk into Lompoc as Inmate 88087-510 four months prior. But CZ writes that standing on that stage, he didn't feel triumphant; he just felt a strange sense of peace. "I didn't have anything left to prove."

Chapter 16: Binance Without Me

As part of his plea deal, CZ agreed to step away from all operational management of Binance for three years. This chapter explores his struggle to accept this reality, and how the company operated in his absence.

The new CEO, Richard Teng—a Singaporean with a deep traditional finance regulatory background—took the helm. That choice was a signal in itself: Binance was pivoting from "founder-driven wild growth" to "institutionalized compliance." He Yi remained as Co-Founder and Chief Customer Service Officer, anchoring the user and brand sides. CZ kept his ~90% equity but was barred from making operational decisions.

CZ details the agony of this "look but don't touch" reality. He watched Binance make product pivots he disagreed with, but couldn't intervene. He saw rivals outmaneuver them in certain niches, but couldn't marshal resources to fight back. He went from being an omnipotent founder to a bystander relying on public press releases to know what his own company was doing.

Yet, he admits Binance performed better without him than many anticipated. By January 2025, the platform boasted over 250 million registered users, operations were stable, and team morale hadn't cracked. He likens the feeling to a parent watching a child grow up and move out—you know it's right, you know they'll be fine, but you still miss making the decisions. "Perhaps," he muses, "this is what true decentralization looks like—not the kind you design, but the kind you are forced to accept."

Chapter 17: Education is the Next Mission

Barred from running an exchange, CZ found a new North Star. He launched Giggle Academy, a free digital education project aimed at illiterate adults and unbanked children globally. The idea took root in prison, he explains, when he realized while teaching his fellow inmates that "education is the only thing that actually changes destinies."

Simultaneously, he continued to back early-stage founders through Binance Labs, focusing on Web3 infrastructure, AI, and Decentralized Science (DeSci). In January 2025, he invested $16 million in Sign (an airdrop service protocol). In April 2025, Pakistan appointed him as a strategic advisor to their newly formed crypto committee to help draft regulatory frameworks.

His goal shifted from "building the world's largest exchange" to "helping hundreds of founders build unicorns."

Part V: Philosophy and Reflections (Chapters 18–21)

If the first four parts are the "what happened," Part V is the "what I learned." CZ steps away from the narrative and takes on the role of a thinker. This is likely the most debated section of the book—because when a man who just paid $7.2 billion in fines starts lecturing on financial freedom, regulation, and leadership, readers naturally raise an eyebrow.

Chapter 18: The Freedom of Money

This is the philosophical core of the book and the origin of its title. CZ’s central thesis is that cryptocurrency isn't a speculative casino; it is the financial infrastructure for the billions of unbanked people worldwide.

The statistics he cites are staggering: roughly 1.4 billion adults globally don't have a bank account, largely concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. In Africa, 57% of the population lacks access to traditional banking. They can't save, borrow, or remit money—not because they don't want to, but because legacy banks deem them "unprofitable."

Using examples from Nigeria, Venezuela, and Indonesia, CZ argues that crypto’s primary utility in these regions isn't speculation, but hedging against hyperinflation and executing low-cost remittances. He points to Africa's M-Pesa (66 million active users) and Machankura (allowing users to transact Bitcoin over basic cellular networks) to show how these tools are tangibly changing lives.

"The freedom of money is never the finish line; it is the starting line," CZ writes. When a Filipino overseas worker can send money home in seconds for near-zero fees, instead of waiting three days and paying a 10% cut to Western Union—that is the true value of crypto. It’s not about making rich people richer; it's about giving the unbanked their first true financial instrument.

It's a grand vision, but CZ acknowledges the inherent tension: a company built on the ethos of "financial inclusion" was ultimately fined $7.2 billion for AML failures. The friction between idealism and reality is the undercurrent of this entire book.

Chapter 19: The Regulatory Dilemma

The tone here is analytical and detached. CZ speaks not as a defendant, but as an industry observer critiquing the current state of global crypto regulation.

He admits regulation is necessary but fiercely criticizes the U.S. approach of "regulation by enforcement"—using lawsuits to set precedents instead of drafting clear rules. Crypto companies face a paradox: you can't comply with rules that don't exist, but by the time you're sued for "violating" newly interpreted rules, it’s already too late.

He contrasts this with other jurisdictions: Japan passed the Payment Services Act amendment back in 2017 to provide a clear licensing framework; Singapore’s MAS set up transparent sandbox mechanisms; the UAE created VARA to attract global crypto firms. Meanwhile, the U.S. SEC and CFTC have spent years bickering over whether crypto assets are securities or commodities, leaving businesses to operate in a gray zone until the hammer drops.

CZ also tackles a controversial point: he argues that crypto is actually too transparent, which hurts user privacy. Every on-chain transaction is public forever—a boon for law enforcement, but potentially an overexposure of personal financial data for everyday users. Legacy bank records at least offer privacy; blockchains do not.

He pleads for governments to establish clear, predictable frameworks rather than relying on retroactive punishment. "Regulation should be like traffic laws," he writes. "You put up the stop sign first, and then you ticket the people who run it. You don't hide at an unmarked intersection waiting to arrest people."

Chapter 20: Lessons in Leadership

This chapter is a masterclass in CZ’s management philosophy. Operating a remote team of 10,000+ people required a deeply unorthodox approach.

On Communication: CZ despises inefficiency. He believes the ideal meeting length is five minutes. "If you can't reach a consensus in five minutes, people didn't prep." He banned PowerPoint inside Binance—demanding plain text and simple bar charts instead. "A 15-minute meeting needs 3-5 bullet points. A monthly recap should fit on half a page." He also outlawed "social meetings" designed merely to introduce people and provide background.

On Feedback: He believes "99% of people do not give enough feedback." In a remote setup devoid of body language, you have to overcompensate with blunt, direct written feedback. However, he also practices "limited positive feedback"—excellence should be the baseline; it doesn't warrant a gold star. Genuine recognition comes via salary adjustments.

On Talent: His hiring mantra is: "Take a long time to hire, but fire fast." If you have doubts about a candidate, reject them immediately—"the doubt is the answer." He is ruthless regarding motivation: "Never try to motivate an unmotivated person."

The "No Ultimatums" Rule: A principle he highlights repeatedly, stemming from a college relationship. He candidly shares this personal anecdote to illustrate that ultimatums are toxic in any dynamic (business or personal). You are always free to walk away, but never threaten a partner with an "either/or" scenario.

He also shares a quirky personal habit: he sleeps only 5-6 hours a night, supplemented by a 30-45 minute nap. He claims the hours immediately following his nap are his brain's peak time for deep thinking.

Chapter 21: The Loneliness of the Entrepreneur

An unexpectedly vulnerable chapter, carrying the highest emotional density of the book.

From the day Binance launched in 2017, CZ lived a nomadic life. He had no permanent home—"Wherever I sit, that is Binance HQ." This wasn't entirely by choice; it was a strategy to avoid being pinned down by any single regulatory body. He even took UAE citizenship, partly because the UAE has no extradition treaty with the U.S.

But the psychological toll was massive. He describes a profound sense of detachment: the public saw a billionaire titan building an empire; internally, he felt the strain of missing his children's milestones, the tension in his relationship with He Yi due to their grueling schedules, and an emotional numbness brought on by chronic, high-stakes stress.

Recalling his father—"spending all day in the lab, never coming to my games"—CZ admits he "definitely inherited that trait." This self-awareness makes the chapter feel incredibly raw.

Prison forced a hard reset. No phone, no email, no market volatility to respond to. For a man accustomed to operating at lightspeed, this mandatory stillness was agonizing at first, but eventually liberating. "For the first time, I actually had time to think—not about the next product roadmap, but about what kind of life I actually wanted."

This chapter will resonate far beyond the crypto industry—any founder who has survived hypergrowth will see their own reflection here.

Part VI: The Industry and Its People (Chapters 22–25)

These final four chapters pack the biggest punch. CZ names names, calling out key figures in the industry. Some are tributes, some are indictments, and some fall somewhere in between. This section immediately set the crypto world on fire upon publication, making Star Xu’s Twitter counterattack and the revelations of SBF’s ties to Gensler the biggest stories of the week.

Chapter 22: The Faces of Crypto

The most explosive chapter in the book. CZ unpacks his history with several industry heavyweights:

Star Xu (OKCoin/OKX): This re-ignited the industry’s longest-running feud. In mid-2014, CZ joined OKCoin as CTO with a 10% equity promise, managing their Bitcoin.com domain partnership with Roger Ver. CZ left in January 2015, and an ugly contract dispute erupted over two versions of a contract: V7 and V8. Both sides accused the other of forgery. Star Xu accused CZ of "forging the contract," as the V8 version contained clauses requiring OKCoin to pay Ver massive compensation, and Xu claimed only V7 and prior were official. CZ fires back in the book, stating OKCoin's internal management was a disaster run on verbal agreements, and that Xu "invented document issues to dodge his obligations."

When CZ resigned, Xu demanded He Yi publicly attack CZ. She refused and resigned as well. CZ hints this was the catalyst that eventually brought her to Binance.

The biggest bombshell comes from Lin Li (Founder of Huobi): CZ claims that at a dinner in 2025—their first meeting in 11 years—Li told him he saw a screenshot proving Star Xu personally tipped off Chinese police about Li, leading to Li's 2020 arrest and ~90-day detention. Li later sold Huobi to an entity linked to Justin Sun for roughly $1 billion.

Upon the book's release, Star Xu immediately fired back on X (Twitter), calling CZ a "pathological liar" and issuing a point-by-point rebuttal. A twelve-year-old grudge was thrust back onto the front pages.

Jian Zhang (Founder of FCoin): CZ accuses Zhang of using user funds to buy luxury condos in Singapore after the exchange collapsed.

SBF: Adding to Chapter 10, CZ provides fresh details on how SBF used political donations to buy influence in D.C., and details his early backchannel connections to former SEC Chair Gary Gensler. CZ implies SBF weaponized these political ties to push for regulatory enforcement against rivals, Binance included.

Chapter 23: To the Builders of Tomorrow

CZ shifts into mentor mode, condensing his eleven years in crypto (2013-2024) into advice for the next generation.

On Timing: Don't chase the meta. If everyone is rushing into a vertical, it's already too crowded. Real opportunity lies where "nobody is looking yet." He uses Binance as the prime example: in 2017, when everyone was laser-focused on Bitcoin trading pairs, Binance aggressively supported ERC-20 tokens.

On Compliance: Perhaps his most hard-won lesson after a $7.2 billion fine. "Compliance is not an obstacle; it is the foundation of survival." He admits that if Binance had invested heavier in compliance in 2017—even if it slowed growth—he wouldn't be writing this book in a prison cell in 2024.

Execution vs. Technology: Execution beats pure tech every time. Binance didn't invent any groundbreaking tech; their trading engine and UI were not vastly superior to their peers. But their execution velocity—from identifying a feature to shipping it—was unmatched. "Binance's original goal was to break into the top 10 within three years. We became number one in five months."

On Token Utility: He pushes back on the narrative that "good products don't need tokens." It's not about "needing" a token; it's about letting the users become co-owners of the network. He sees massive untapped potential in DeFi, cross-chain infrastructure, and DeSci.

On Scalability: If a product can't scale, kill it. "Start with a Minimum Viable Product, scale it aggressively, or shut it down ruthlessly."

Chapter 24: He Yi

A chapter dedicated entirely to He Yi—CZ’s business partner and life partner, and the mother of his three children.

He Yi’s trajectory is a legend in its own right. Born Yi He in 1986 to a poor family, she worked as a beverage promoter in a supermarket at 16. By 20, she was in Beijing studying for a master's in psychological counseling at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Leveraging her charisma and communication skills, she became a travel show host in 2012. After a stint at Yixia Tech, she published an essay titled "Starting Over at 30," rejoined the crypto industry in August 2017 as Binance's CMO, and dubbed herself the "Chief Customer Service Officer."

He Yi wrote the foreword for the book, noting that CZ "has always just been himself." In this chapter, CZ pours out his gratitude. During his four months in prison, she single-handedly carried the operational weight of the world's largest exchange. When the market wondered if Binance could survive without CZ, she provided the answer.

The intimacy of this chapter makes it the warmest part of the book. CZ writes that he has made many pivotal decisions in his life, but the best one was that "little trick" he used on the night of July 13, 2017, to get her to join Binance.

Chapter 25: The Leaderless Coin

The final chapter returns to the philosophical bedrock of crypto. CZ makes a simple observation: Bitcoin is the most successful decentralized project on earth, and its creator, Satoshi Nakamoto, has been missing for over a decade. No CEO, no board of directors, no quarterly earnings—yet it runs perfectly, holds immense value, and cannot be shut down.

While Ethereum's Vitalik Buterin hasn't vanished, he is intentionally stepping back to let the community govern itself. CZ argues a counterintuitive point: A founder's exit is not a failure; it is the ultimate mark of a project's maturity.

He applies this to his own exit from Binance. In 2024, he was forced out of the company he built—but Binance didn't collapse. 300 million users still trade on it, the engine still hums, and the team still ships. "Binance survived without me, just as Bitcoin survived without Satoshi."

Yet, he honestly grapples with the nuance: Binance’s "decentralization" was mandated by the government, not engineered by design. Satoshi left by choice; CZ left by court order. The space between those two realities presents a philosophical question for the entire industry: Is decentralization an ideal we strive for, or a reality we are forced to accept under pressure?

The book ends with a brief line that echoes what he spent months pondering in his cell: "True freedom is not owning everything, but knowing exactly who you are even if you lose it all."

Appendix: 72 Life Principles

The book concludes with 72 principles for life and work, inspired by Ray Dalio’s Principles. But CZ's methodology was different: he spent three years logging his daily decisions and the logic behind them, actively filtering out "obvious common sense" to keep only the counterintuitive insights. These are divided into seven categories: Mindset, Team Management, Business Partnerships, Communication, Product Philosophy, PR, and Personal Life. Highlights include:

Mindset:

  • Don't waste time: It is our most scarce resource. Instead of a to-do list, maintain a "Not-to-do" list. Cut out small talk, gossip, and pointless meetings.
  • Don't just chase money: Create value instead of hunting profit. Maintain reasonable margins to encourage repeat business, and wealth will naturally follow.
  • Be an early adopter: Strategically embrace emerging tech. Manage your downside risk, but position yourself for exponential upside.
  • Don't be fooled by labels: Organizations, money, titles, and countries are all artificial constructs. Look at the essence of things, not their superficial categorizations.

Team Management:

  • Team over individual: A strong team elevates mediocre performers, but individual brilliance rarely survives a dysfunctional team.
  • Rotate teams frequently: Prevent organizational rot, groom new leaders, and adapt the structure as the architecture evolves.
  • Measure by output: Track users, revenue, and market share—not the number of tasks, features, meetings, or hours logged.
  • Don't get too attached to goals: In a fast-moving market, goals are just rough guesses. Binance aimed for the top 10 in three years; they hit number one in five months.

Business Partnerships:

  • Keep it simple: Complex partnerships introduce too many variables, misunderstandings, and painful exits.
  • Always include an exit clause: Plan for the worst-case scenario, not the best-case.
  • Reject exclusivity: Demanding exclusivity reeks of insecurity. A true win-win doesn't require locking the other party in a cage.

Communication:

  • No PowerPoint: Bullet points and bar charts are vastly superior. Slide decks are a waste of prep time.
  • One message per thought: Don't trigger a dozen notifications. Gather your thoughts before hitting send.
  • Never argue over IM: Nuance and tone are lost in text. Save arguments for voice or video calls.
  • Keep meetings under 10 people: Include only essential personnel. Anything over 10 people is a broadcast, not a discussion.

Personal Life:

  • I do not crave fancy offices: Luxury fades quickly as you adapt. What matters is high-speed Wi-Fi, external monitors, and a standing desk.
  • Keep a calm disposition: Emotional equilibrium under stress dramatically improves decision quality. A strong moral compass and a desire to make a positive impact melt away anxiety.

Ray Dalio himself provided a blurb for the book: "I am delighted that he has so clearly laid out his life story... a fascinating read about how CZ built Binance." How many of these principles CZ still follows, and how many were amended by the reality of prison, is a question perhaps only the reader can decide.

Is It Worth Reading?

Freedom of Money is neither a crypto textbook nor a standard business guide. As CZ puts it: "This is not a sanitized corporate history. It reflects the raw reality of building in an era when the industry was still taking shape—the successes, the mistakes, and the lessons learned from both."

It undoubtedly contains subjective justifications and self-defense—as all memoirs do. But it offers an unprecedented look under the hood: an immigrant boy from rural Jiangsu flipping burgers for two years, learning to code in a university lab, selling his apartment to go all-in on Bitcoin, building a $100 billion empire with 300 million users in seven years, losing control of it in months, and then typing it all out on a prison computer, 15 minutes at a time.

For industry insiders and observers, the value isn't whether "CZ is telling the absolute truth," but in seeing how a titan processes critical, split-second decisions—including the ones he admits were wrong.

As one reviewer pointed out: In a crypto world where old billionaires are just replaced by new billionaires making the exact same mistakes, "that’s not a revolution—that’s just a rebrand." Did CZ truly learn his lesson from the DOJ, or did he just upgrade his PR strategy?

The three words CZ leans on the most in this book are Luck, Resilience, and Protecting Users. You can view them as the myth-making of an entrepreneur, or you can take them as the genuine reflections of a man who survived the storm. With 100% of the royalties going to charity, he is, at the very least, putting his money where his mouth is.

Regulatory Storm: Dilemma and Opportunities in the Crypto Industry

· 42 min read

Author: Phoenix Capital Management

Translator: BlockEden.xyz Team and Payton Chat

📌 A deep dive into the regulatory disputes and legal issues the crypto industry faces in the past, now, and predictably in the future.

TL;DR

  • In the Ripple case, a partial victory was achieved in the programmatic sales, avoiding being recognized as securities sales. We have carefully analyzed the court's ruling logic and believe that there may be quite obvious errors in fact recognition, which has a high possibility of being overturned later.
  • We've examined the historical origins and basic connotations of securities law, and believe that tokens narrated as "the project team is doing their job" are close to the securities law definition. Thus, a reasonably high proportion of tokens may be recognized as securities in the future. However, the current SEC's regulatory demands further exceed the reasonable scope of securities law.
  • Staking/yield farming is more likely to be considered securities than token sales.
  • Compared to the regulation of CeFi, the regulation of DeFi is at an earlier stage. In addition to securities law, more uncontroversial regulatory issues like KYC/AML are yet to be resolved.
  • Even if a large number of altcoins are identified as securities, it would not signify the end of the industry. High market cap tokens are fully capable of seeking compliance in the form of securities; lower market cap tokens may exist in non-compliant markets for a long time but can still indirectly gain liquidity from compliant markets. As long as there is a clear regulatory framework, regardless of its nature, the industry can find new paths and models for long-term development.

Table of Contents

Long-Awaited (Temporary) Victory - An Interpretation of the Ripple Case

On July 13, 2023, Ripple Labs received a partial favorable ruling from the New York District Court, causing a significant surge in the crypto market. In addition to XRP itself, a series of tokens previously identified as securities by the SEC also experienced a substantial increase.

As we will discuss later, we are still far from the era when the crypto industry truly embraces clear regulation. However, without a doubt, this partial victory of Ripple Labs remains one of the most important events in the crypto industry in 2023.

Below are some of the major disputes between U.S. regulators and the crypto industry before the SEC vs. Ripple Labs case.

CaseDate SettledHow it's Settled
SEC vs Block.one (EOS)2019/09Block.one Settles with SEC, Pays $24mn Fine
SEC vs Telegram2020/06Court Rules Telegram's Actions as Selling Unregistered Securities, Telegram Returns $1.2bn to Investors and Pays $18.5mn Fine
CFTC vs BitMEX2021/08Court Determines BitMEX Engaged in Illegal Derivative Trading (specific projects are too numerous to elaborate), BitMEX Pays $100mn Fine and Ceases Illegal Activities
SEC vs BlockFi2022/02BlockFi Settles with SEC, Seeks Business Compliance, and Pays $100mn Fine
SEC vs Nexo2023/01Nexo Settles with SEC, Shuts Down Lending Business, and Pays $45mn Fine
SEC vs Kraken2023/02Kraken Settles with SEC, Shuts Down Staking Business, and Pays $30mn Fine
CFTC vs Ooki DAO2023/06Court Determines Ooki DAO as an Illegal Futures Trading Platform, Orders to Shut Down All Business, and Pays a $644k Fine

It's not hard to see that nearly all the major disputes so far have ended in failure or compromise by crypto companies.

We still want to say, this represents the first meaningful victory for the crypto industry in its battles against U.S. regulators, even if it is only a partial victory.

There have been many detailed interpretations of the court's judgment, so we won't elaborate here. Those who are interested can read the long Twitter thread by Justin Slaughter, Paradigm Policy Director:

Justin Slaughter on Twitter:

You can also read the original text of the court's ruling in your leisure time:

Plaintiff vs. Ripple Labs, Inc.

Before further interpreting this ruling, let's briefly introduce the core standard for the definition of securities in the U.S. legal system that you often hear about, the Howey Test.

Howey Test, Orange Groves, and Cryptocurrency

Untitled

To understand the disputes surrounding all cryptocurrency regulations today, we must go back to sunny Florida in 1946, to the cornerstone case for today's securities law judgment, SEC vs. Howey.

(The following story outline was mainly written with the help of GPT-4)

📌 After World War II, in 1946, the company W.J. Howey owned a fertile orange grove in picturesque Florida.

To raise more investment, the Howey company launched an innovative plan that allowed investors to purchase land in the orange grove and lease it to the Howey company for management, from which investors could earn a portion of the profits. In that era, this proposition was undoubtedly very attractive to investors. After all, owning your own land was such a tempting thing.

However, the SEC did not agree. The SEC believed that the plan offered by Howey Company was essentially a security, but Howey Company had not registered with the SEC, which clearly violated the Securities Act of 1933. Therefore, the SEC decided to sue the Howey Company.

This lawsuit eventually ended up in the Supreme Court. In 1946, the Supreme Court made a historic judgment in the lawsuit of SEC vs. Howey. The court supported the SEC's stance, ruling that Howey Company's investment plan met the definition of securities, and therefore needed to be registered with the SEC.

The U.S. Supreme Court's judgment on Howey Company's investment plan was based on the four basic elements of the so-called "Howey Test". These four elements are: investment of money, expectation of profits, common enterprise, and the profits come from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. Howey Company's investment plan met these four elements, so the Supreme Court determined it was a security.

  1. First, investors invested money to purchase land in the orange grove, which met the first element of the "Howey Test"—investment of money.
  2. Secondly, the purpose of investors buying land and leasing it to the Howey Company was obviously to expect profits, which met the second element of the "Howey Test"—expectation of profits.
  3. Third, the relationship between investors and the Howey Company constituted a common enterprise. Investors invested, and the Howey Company operated the orange grove, both working towards earning profits. This met the third element of the "Howey Test"—common enterprise.
  4. Lastly, the profits in this investment plan mainly came from the efforts of the Howey Company. Investors only needed to invest money and could reap the benefits, which met the fourth element of the "Howey Test"—the profits come from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.

Therefore, according to these four elements, the Supreme Court judged that Howey Company's investment plan constituted a security and needed to be registered with the SEC.

This judgment had profound implications and formed the widely cited "Howey Test", defining the four basic elements of so-called "investment contracts": investment of money, expectation of profits, common enterprise, and profits come from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. These four elements are still used by the SEC to determine whether a financial product constitutes a security.

For purposes of the Securities Act, an investment contract (undefined by the Act) means a contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.

The above is an accurate interpretation of securities from the 1946 Supreme Court opinion, which can be broken down into the following commonly used criteria:

  1. An investment of money
  2. in a common enterprise
  3. to expect profits
  4. solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party

The charm of law is truly remarkable. It often employs abstract yet straightforward principles to guide the ever-changing specificities in real-life scenarios, no matter it is a citrus grove or cryptocurrency.

Why Securities Law Exists

In fact, how securities are defined is not important. Labeling something as a security or not doesn't make any substantive difference. The key is to understand what legal responsibilities stem from the economic nature of securities, in other words, why something possessing the four attributes of the Howey Test needs a separate legal framework for supervision.

The Securities Act of 1933, which predates the Howey Test by over a decade, explicitly answers the question of why securities laws are needed.

Often referred to as the "truth in securities" law, the Securities Act of 1933 has two basic objectives:

1) require that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and

2) prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.

"The fundamental starting point of securities law is simple - it's all about ensuring that investors have enough information about the securities they are investing in and are protected from deception. Conversely, the responsibilities imposed on the issuers of securities are straightforward, the essence of which is disclosure - they must provide complete, timely, and accurate disclosure of important information related to the securities.

The reason for such a goal of securities law is because securities, by their nature, rely on the efforts of third parties (active participants) for returns, which gives these third parties an asymmetric advantage over investors in terms of access to information and influence on securities prices. Therefore, there's a requirement for them to fulfill the duty of disclosure, to ensure that this asymmetry does not harm the investors.

There's no similar regulatory requirement in commodities markets because there are no such third parties, or in the crypto context, 'project teams'. Gold, oil, and sugar, for example, have no 'project teams'. The crypto market generally has a preference for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) over the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), but this is not due to personal preferences of the regulators that lead to differing attitudes towards crypto. The distinction between regulating commodities and regulating securities is based on the intrinsic differences between the two types of financial products. Because there are no 'project teams' with an asymmetric advantage, the regulatory framework for commodity law naturally tends to be more relaxed.

💡 The existence of a third party or 'Project Team' with an information and influence advantage is the fundamental reason for the existence of securities law; to curb the infringement of investors' interests by the third party/'Project Team' is the fundamental purpose of securities law; and requiring the 'Project Team' to provide complete, timely, accurate information disclosure is the main means of implementing securities law."

Project team is doing their job = Securities?

During my study of the history of U.S. securities law, a phrase often heard in the crypto industry led me to a simple and effective standard to determine whether a token is a security - that is, whether the investor cares whether the Project Team is active or not.

If the "the project team is doing their job" matters to investors, it implies that the return on this investment is influenced by the actions of the Project Team, which clearly meets the four criteria of the Howey Test. From this perspective, it's easy to understand why BTC is not a security, as there is no Project Team involved with BTC. The same applies to meme coins, they are merely digits in the ledger under the ERC-20 protocol, with no active Project Team behind them, and therefore are not securities.

If a Project Team is active and whether they perform well or poorly, or act at all, - whether it's in terms of technical upgrades, product iterations, marketing, ecosystem partnerships - has an impact on the token price, then the definition of a security is met. Given the existence of a Project Team, they possess information unknown to other investors and have greater influence on the token price, hence the need for regulatory oversight to ensure that they do not commit acts that harm the interests of investors. The logic of "the actions of the Project Team matter" → "the Project Team can reap the benefits"→ "the Project Team needs to be regulated by securities law" is a simple legal inference.

If you accept this logic, you can judge for yourself which tokens in the crypto space are reasonably classified as securities.

top search result of "项目方在做事" on Twitter

💡 In our view, if there is an expectation or concern among investors about the "the project team is doing their job," this token highly aligns with the definition of a security. From this perspective, it seems quite logical that a high proportion of tokens are classified as securities.

The current SEC wants more than just the basic regulations. As seen from Gary's public statements, he only recognizes that Bitcoin is not a security. For most other tokens, he firmly believes they should be classified as securities. The stance on a few tokens, like ETH, is relatively ambiguous. The CEO of Coinbase also recently mentioned in an interview that before the SEC sued Coinbase, it had demanded that Coinbase cease trading all tokens except for Bitcoin, a request that Coinbase refused.

We think it's unreasonable to classify pure meme coins without an operational project team or decentralized payment tokens as securities. The SEC's demands have exceeded the reasonable scope of securities laws, which has made it harder for the conflict between the industry and the SEC to be resolved simply.

You can read more on the topic in this article: SEC asked Coinbase to halt trading in everything except bitcoin, CEO says."

Recap of SEC vs Ripple Labs

  • Let's briefly highlight a few key points:
    • XRP itself is not a security, but we need to analyze the specific circumstances of XRP sales (such as the process, method, and channels of sale, etc.) to determine whether it constitutes a securities sale. We will elaborate on this point later: A token is just a token. A token is NEVER a security.
    • The court analyzed three forms of XRP sales separately: institutional sales, programmatic sales, and others. In the end, the first type, institutional sales, was considered as securities, while the other two were not.
    • The reasons for judging institutional sales as securities sales are:
Howey Test's RulesAnalysis
1. An investment
of money
✅ It satisfies the criteria; institutional investors made payments to XRP, and Ripple Labs argued that not only is 'payment of money' required, but also 'an intent to invest'. This claim was rejected by the court.
2. in a common
enterprise
✅ It satisfies the criteria; the funds invested by the investors were collectively received and managed by Ripple Labs, and what the investors received were the same fungible XRP tokens.
3. to expect
profits
✅ It satisfies the criteria;
1) All the promotional materials from Ripple received by the investors clearly mention in various ways that the success of the Ripple protocol would drive up the price of XRP.
2) The existence of the lock-up clause directly proves that the investors' intent in purchasing XRP could only be investment and not consumption ('a rational economic actor would not agree to freeze millions of dollars').
4. solely from
the efforts of
the promoter
or a third party
✅ It satisfies the criteria; Ripple Labs explicitly linked the rise in XRP price to the technical advantages of Ripple Labs, the potential for widespread use of the product, the professional capabilities of the team, and successful market marketing in its promotions.
  • The reasons for judging programmatic sales as not constituting securities sales are:

    1. In this case, investors are not sure whether they are buying from Ripple Labs or other XRP sellers. Most XRP trading volume does not come from sales by Ripple Labs, so most XRP buyers have not directly invested their funds into Ripple Labs.

    2. XRP buyers did not expect to profit from Ripple Labs' efforts, because:

    • Ripple Labs did not make any direct promises to these investors, and there is no evidence that Ripple Labs' promotional materials were widely disseminated among these investors.

    • These investors are less sophisticated, and it cannot be proven that they have a full understanding of the impact of Ripple Labs' actions on the price of XRP.

  • It's not hard to see that the court's judgement on programmatic sales is primarily based on the fourth item of the Howey Test, which is that these investors did not expect to profit from Ripple Labs' efforts.

  • The judgement of this district court does not have final binding force; it can almost be certain that the SEC will appeal. However, due to the lengthy legal process, it might take several months or even years before we see the results of a new appeal judgement. During this time, the judgement of this court will essentially form important guidance for the development of the industry.

Putting aside our position as cryptocurrency investors, and solely from the standpoint of legal logic, we believe that the court's logic in determining programmatic sales as not being securities is not very convincing.

📕 Here are two articles by seasoned legal professionals with similar opposing views. I recommend reading them if you have time, as our analysis also draws on some of their viewpoints.

First, we need to note the original text of the Howey Test: '...expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party...', which clearly points out that the source of profits can be the promoter or a third party, that is, it does not matter who the seller is. Or to say, it is not necessary for the source of the efforts to be the seller or promoter, as long as there is such a third party. Therefore, it does not matter who the investor buys from or whether the seller is the source of the returns. What matters is whether the investor realizes that the appreciation of the asset comes from the efforts of a third party. Therefore, the court's mention of blind buy/sell and the fact that buyers do not know whether they bought XRP from Ripple Labs or someone else is irrelevant to the Howey Test.

The real issue is whether investors in programmatic sales realize that the rise in the price of the XRP token they bought is related to the efforts of Ripple Labs. The court's main argument is that

  1. Ripple Labs has not directly promoted to retail, nor is there evidence that their materials (white papers, etc.) have been widely disseminated among retail,
  2. Retail does not have the cognitive abilities of institutional investors to recognize that the XRP token is related to the work Ripple Labs does in technology, product, and marketing.

First of all, this is a factual issue, not a logical one, which we can't demonstrate here. XRP is an old project, and we don't have a clear sense of what the retail investors were like at that time.

But from our limited experience, the vast majority of tokens with a project team are able to realize that the team's technical upgrades, early mainnet launch, better product, increase in TVL, ecosystem partnerships, KOL promotions, and other efforts have an impact on the price of the token they hold.

In the world of crypto, KOLs, Twitter, and Telegram groups large and small serve as the bridge between most project teams and users, the territory for outreach to retail investors. In projects big and small, we often hear discussions about how the 'community' is doing. Most project teams will have a token marketing/community team responsible for contacting exchanges around the world, hiring KOLs, and helping to disseminate project progress and important events.

💡We believe there is a bias in the court's fact-finding on programmatic sales in this ruling; we also agree with many legal professionals that there is a high likelihood that this part of the judgment will be overturned in the future.

(Just a week after writing this article, on the very day it was about to be published, we happened to see that the new judge in the SEC vs Terraform Labs case refused to adopt the judgment logic in the SEC vs Ripple Labs case - the logic being that no matter where the investor buys the token, it does not affect the investor's expectation that the efforts of the project team will influence the token's price.)

"Whatever expectation of profit they had could not, according to that court, be ascribed to defendants’ efforts," he wrote. "But Howey makes no such distinction between purchasers**. And it makes good sense that it did not. That a purchaser bought the coins directly from the defendants or, instead, in a secondary resale transaction has no impact on whether a reasonable individual would objectively view the defendants’ actions and statements as evincing a promise of profits based on their efforts.**"

Judge Rejects Ripple Ruling Precedent in Denying Terraform Labs' Motion to Dismiss SEC Lawsuit

☕️ By the way - Airdrops that don't require payment can also be considered securities sales.

This comes from an article by John Reed Stark. In the Internet bubble of the late 90s, several companies distributed free stocks to users via the internet. In subsequent legislation and trials, these actions were deemed securities sales. The reason is that although users did not pay money in exchange for these stocks, they gave up other values - including their personal information (required to fill in when registering for stocks) and increased attention for the companies distributing the stocks, which constituted a substantial exchange of value.

SEC Enforcement Director Richard H. Walker said at the time, "Free stock is really a misnomer in these cases. While cash did not change hands, the companies that issued the stock received valuable benefits**. Under these circumstances, the securities laws entitle investors to full and fair disclosure, which they did not receive in these cases.”

A token is just a token. A token is NEVER a security

As pointed out by Coinbase CLO Paul, this is the most important sentence in the entire judgement that people have not fully understood.

XRP, as a digital token, is not in and of itself a “contract, transaction[,] or scheme” that embodies the Howey requirements of an investment contract**. Rather, the Court examines the totality of circumstances surrounding Defendants’ different transactions and schemes involving the sale and distribution of XRP.

Both of these judgments consistently express an important point of view:

A token is just a token - it's not like many people mistakenly believe that the court sometimes thinks XRP is a security and sometimes not - a token itself can never be a security.

What might constitute a security is the whole set of behaviors of selling and distributing tokens ('scheme'), there is no question of whether a token is a security or not, only whether a specific token sale behavior is a security or not. We can never come to the conclusion of whether it is a security or not just by analyzing a certain token, we must analyze the overall situation of this sales behavior ('entirety of …', 'totality of circumstances').

Both judges, whose opinions have significant conflicts, have insisted that it must be based on sales conditions rather than the attributes of the token itself to determine whether it is a security - this consistency also means that the possibility of this legal logic being adopted in the future is significantly higher than the judgment for programmatic sales, and we also believe that this judgment indeed has stronger logical reasonableness.

A token is just a token. A token is NEVER a security.

Digital tokens and stocks are fundamentally different. Stocks themselves are a contract signed by investors and companies. Their trading in the secondary market itself represents the trading and transfer of this contractual relationship. As the judge said in the Telegram case, digital tokens are nothing more than an 'alphanumeric cryptographic sequence', and they cannot possibly constitute a contract by themselves. They can only have the economic substance of a contract in specific sales situations.

If this legal point of view is accepted by all subsequent courts, then the future burden of proof on the SEC in the litigation process will be significantly increased. The SEC cannot obtain the regulatory power over all the issuance, trading, and other behaviors of a certain token by proving that it is a security. It needs to prove one by one that the overall situation of each token transaction constitutes a securities transaction.

The Court does not address whether secondary market sales of XRP constitute offers and sales of investment contracts because that question is not properly before the Court. Whether a secondary market sale constitutes an offer or sale of an investment contract would depend on the totality of circumstances and the economic reality of that specific contract, transaction, or scheme. See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560 n.11; Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d at 379; see also ECF No. 105 at 34:14-16, LBRY, No. 21 Civ. 260 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 2023)*

The Ripple case also explicitly pointed out that the court cannot determine whether the secondary sale of XRP constitutes a securities transaction. They need to assess the specific situation of each trading behavior to make a judgment. This greatly complicates the SEC's regulation of secondary transactions, and in some ways it may not be possible to complete; this essentially gives the green light to the secondary trading of tokens. Based on this, Coinbase and Binance.US quickly relisted XRP after the verdict was announced.

📕 There are some interesting discussions related to this in the Bankless podcast:

Bankless: How Ripple's Win Reshapes Crypto with Paul Grewal & Mike Selig

Again, it is still too early to consider this judgment as a definitive legal rule based solely on this case; but the legal logic of "A token is just a token" will indeed significantly increase the legal obstacles the SEC will face in regulating transactions of the secondary market in the future.

Looking forward - Where are the risks and opportunities?

The Sword of Damocles Over Staking

Sword of Damocles, 1812, Richard Westall

Sword of Damocles, 1812, Richard Westall

ETH staking has been one of the strongest tracks in the entire industry since 2023; however, the regulatory risks of staking services are still a Sword of Damocles over this super track.

In February 2023, Kraken agreed to a settlement with the SEC and shut down its staking service in the US. Coinbase, which was also sued for its staking service, chose to continue fighting.

Returning to the framework of the Howey Test, objectively speaking, there are indeed sufficient reasons for staking services to be considered securities.

Howey Test's RulesAnalysis
1. An investment
of money
✅ It satisfies the criteria; invest ETH
2. in a common
enterprise
✅ It satisfies the criteria; invested ETHs are pooled together
3. to expect
profits
✅ It satisfies the criteria; Investors expects staking yields
4. solely from
the efforts of
the promoter
or a third party
✅ It satisfies the criteria; staking yields come from the node operator's work and the node operator charges commission from the work.

Kraken chose to settle. So, what are Coinbase's reasons for insisting that staking services are not securities?

Coinbase: Why we stand by staking:

At its most basic level, staking is the process by which users can contribute to the network by staking their token to secure the blockchain, facilitate the creation of blocks, and help process transactions. Users are not investing. Rather, users are compensated for fulfilling this important role through transaction fees and consensus rewards paid by the blockchain itself.

Coinbase makes an interesting statement, suggesting that "users who stake are not investing, but rather being compensated for the contribution they make to the blockchain network."

This statement is valid for individual stakers. However, as delegated stakers, they do not directly undertake the task of validating transactions or ensuring network security. Instead, they delegate their tokens to other node operators who use their tokens to complete these tasks. Stakers are not the direct laborers. In fact, they resemble the buyers of orange farm in the Howey case, owning land/capital (ETH), delegating others to cultivate (node operation), and obtaining returns.

Paying out capital is not labor, because the return from capital investment is a capital gain, not compensation.

Decentralized staking services are a bit more complex, and different types of decentralized staking might eventually receive different legal judgments.

The four criteria of the Howey Test are mostly similar in centralized staking and decentralized staking. The difference might lie in whether a common enterprise can exist. So, the staking model where all users' ETH is put into the same pool, even if it's decentralized, clearly also meets the four criteria of the Howey Test.

The argument in SEC vs Ripple Labs that allowed Ripple to win the Programatic Sales point (the buyer and seller don't know each other and there is no direct selling introduction), doesn't seem to protect staking services here neither.

Because apart from directly buying cbETH/stETH on the secondary market, in the case where stakers pledge their ETH to Coinbase/Lido and receive cbETH/stETH in return, it's clear that 1) the buyer knows who the issuer is, and the issuer also knows who the buyer is, and 2) the issuer clearly communicates to the buyer about the potential returns and explains the source of these returns.

Stake to earn from Coinbase and Lido.fi

Similarly, in addition to staking on PoS chains, many DeFi products that allow staking/locking tokens to earn yield are likely to meet the definition of securities. If it is somewhat challenging to establish a connection between the price of pure governance tokens and the efforts of the project team, the logic in the context of staking to earn yield is very straightforward and simple. Additionally, the reasoning in the Ripple case that made programmatic sales not considered securities also hardly stands here:

1) Users hand over tokens to staking contracts developed by the project team. The staking contract gives returns to users, and these returns are derived from the revenues generated by the project contracts that the project team opened.

2) During the interaction process between users and the staking contract, the contract also promotes and explains the returns to users, which makes it difficult to get away with the reasoning from XRP's programmatic sales.

💡 In summary, projects that offer staking services (in PoS chains, in DeFi projects) have a higher likelihood of being classified as securities due to

  1. clear profit distribution, and
  2. direct promotion and interaction with users.

This makes them more likely to be considered securities than projects that are generally "doing their job" by the project team.

Securities law is not the only concern

Securities law is the main focus of this article, but it's important to remind everyone that securities law is only a small part of the overall regulatory framework for crypto — of course, it's worth special attention because it is one of the stricter aspects. Whether a token is ultimately regarded as a security, commodity, or something else, some more fundamental legal responsibilities are common, and many regulatory agencies outside of the SEC and CFTC will get involved. The content involved here is worthy of another long article, we will just briefly give an example here for reference.

This is the responsibility related to Know Your Customer (KYC) centered on anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF). Any financial transaction must not be used for financial crimes such as money laundering and terrorist financing, and any financial institution has the responsibility to ensure that the financial services it provides will not be used for these financial crimes. To achieve this goal, all financial institutions must take a series of measures, including but not limited to KYC, transaction monitoring, reporting suspicious activities to regulators, maintaining accurate records of historical transactions, etc.

This is one of the most fundamental, undisputed basic laws in financial regulation, and it is a field jointly supervised by multiple law enforcement departments, including the Department of Justice, Treasury/OFAC, FBI, SEC, etc. Currently, all centralized crypto institutions are also complying with this law to perform necessary KYC on all customers.

Regulations other than SEC

The main potential risk in the future lies in DeFi, whether it is necessary and possible to make DeFi comply with similar regulations as CeFi, requiring KYC/AML/CTF; and whether this regulatory model might harm the foundation of blockchain value, permissionlessness.

From a basic principle point of view, financial transactions are generated in DeFi, so these financial transactions need to ensure that they are not used for money laundering and other financial crimes, so the necessity of regulatory law is undoubted.

The challenge mainly lies in the difficulty in defining the regulatory object, essentially these financial transactions are based on the services provided by a string of code on Ethereum, so is it the Ethereum nodes running this code, or the project parties/developers who wrote this string of code, who should be the regulatory object? (That's why there are controversial cases caused by the arrest of Tornado Cash developers.) In addition, the decentralization of nodes and the anonymization of developers make this oversight thinking even more difficult to implement — this is a problem that legislators and law enforcers must solve, it is questionable how they will solve these problems; but what is unquestionable is that no regulator will allow money laundering, arms trading and other activities on an anonymous blockchain, even if these transactions account for less than one ten-thousandth of the blockchain transactions.

Actually, just on the 19th of this month, four senators from the U.S. Senate (two Republicans and two Democrats, so it's a bipartisan bill) have proposed a legislation for DeFi, the Crypto-Asset National Security Enhancement and Enforcement (CANSEE) Act. The core is to require DeFi to comply with the same legal responsibilities as CeFi:

In an effort to prevent money laundering and stop crypto-facilitated crime and sanctions violations, a leading group of U.S. Senators is introducing new, bipartisan legislation requiring decentralized finance (DeFi) services to meet the same anti-money laundering (AML) and economic sanctions compliance obligations as other financial companies**, including centralized crypto trading platforms, casinos, and even pawn shops. The legislation also modernizes key Treasury Department anti-money laundering authorities, and sets new requirements to ensure that “crypto kiosks” don’t become a vector for laundering the proceeds of illicit activities.

Bipartisan U.S. Senators Unveil Crypto Anti-Money Laundering Bill to Stop Illicit Transfers

Ensuring Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) in DeFi transactions is a key regulatory challenge beyond securities laws. Regardless of whether a token is classified as a security or commodity, there are strict rules against market manipulation. Resolving these issues in crypto is a future challenge for the industry.

Below are some typical forms of market manipulation. Anyone involved in crypto trading will likely recognize them.

Here are some common forms of market manipulation:

  1. Pump and Dump: This involves buying a security at a low price, artificially inflating its price through false and misleading positive statements, and then selling the security at the higher price. Once the manipulator sells their shares, the price typically falls, leaving other investors at a loss.
  2. Spoofing: This involves placing large buy or sell orders with no intention of executing them, to create a false appearance of market interest in a particular security or commodity. The orders are then canceled before execution.
  3. Wash Trading: This involves an investor simultaneously buying and selling the same financial instruments to create misleading, artificial activity in the marketplace.
  4. Churning: This occurs when a trader places both buy and sell orders at the same price. The orders are matched, leaving the impression of high trading volumes, but no net change in ownership.
  5. Cornering the Market: This involves acquiring enough of a particular asset to gain control and set the price on it.
  6. Front Running: This occurs when a broker or other entity enters into a trade because they have foreknowledge of a big non-publicized transaction that will influence the price of the asset, thereby benefiting from the price movement.

What if crypto loses? - Securities law won't kill altcoins

We lack sufficient legal and political knowledge to predict the outcomes of these legal disputes, but objective analysis leads us to acknowledge that the logic of U.S. securities law supports classifying most tokens as securities. So we must deduce or imagine what the crypto industry might look like if most tokens are considered securities.

Some tokens may choose to comply as securities

Firstly, purely from an economic perspective, the compliance cost of being publicly listed isn't as daunting as it might seem. For large-cap tokens with a FDV of over 1 billion, they are likely able to bear the cost.

A simple market value comparison reveals that many tokens have comparable market values to listed companies, especially those with a 1bn+ FDV. It's entirely reasonable to believe that they can handle the compliance costs of a listed company.

  • The U.S. stock market has about 2000 companies with a market value of 100mn-1bn and about 1000 companies with a market value of 1bn-5bn.
  • In the current bear market environment for altcoins, crypto has about 40-50 tokens with a FDV>1bn, and about 200 tokens with a FDV of 100mn-1bn. It's expected that more tokens will join the 100mn+/1bn+ value rank during a bull market.

We can also refer to some research on the compliance cost for listed companies. One relatively reliable source is the SEC's estimation of the listing compliance costs for small and medium-sized companies:

Their research shows that the average cost of achieving regulatory compliance to enter the marketplace as an IPO is about $2.5 million. Once they are established, small-cap companies can expect to pay about $1.5 million in ongoing compliance costs every year.

The conclusion is that there is a ~2.5mn listing cost, and a ~1.5mn ongoing annual cost. Considering inflation over the years, 3-4mn for an IPO and 2-3mn for annual recurring costs seem reasonable estimates. Additionally, these numbers positively correlate with the size of the company, and the costs for microcap companies worth hundreds of millions of dollars should be below these averages. Although it's not a small amount, for large project teams with hundreds of members, it's not an unacceptable cost."

"What's more uncertain is how to resolve these projects' historical compliance issues.

Listing a stock requires an audit of the company's financial history. Tokens, unlike equity, would need to disclose different content for listing, thus requiring a new regulatory framework for clear delineation. However, as long as there are clear rules, there are ways to adjust and deal with them. Companies with historical financial problems can also get the chance to go public by restating their historical statements.

While the cost of compliance is acceptable, it is also quite high; so, are project parties incentivized to do so? There's no simple answer to this question.

Firstly, compliance will indeed impose many burdens on many project parties and limit their operational flexibility. They cannot engage in "market value management," insider trading, false advertising, and coin selling announcements, etc. These restrictions affect the fundamentals of many business models.

However, for projects with particularly large market values, gaining greater market liquidity, accessing more deep-pocketed investors, and obtaining comprehensive regulatory approval are essential conditions for them to move to the next level, whether from the perspective of market value growth or project development.

"'Illegal harvesting' can be fierce, but the 'leek field' is small; 'legal harvesting' must be restrained, but the 'leek field' is large."

As the project scale increases, the balance between the potential benefits of non-compliance and the opportunities brought by the vast market and capital access post-compliance increasingly tips towards the latter. We believe that leading public chains/layer2s and blue-chip DeFis will take this step towards a completely compliant operational model.

Long-term coexistence and interdependence of compliant and non-compliant ecosystems

Of course, most project parties won't be able to embark on the road to securities compliance; the future crypto world will consist of both compliant and non-compliant parts, each with clear boundaries but also closely interconnected."

compliant ecosystemnon-compliant ecosystem
CapitalsOnshore institutional
capital, low-risk-preference
individuals
Offshore institutional capital, crypto-native, high-risk preference individuals
Underlying assetBTC, ETH, a few
compliant large-cap tokens
Most small and medium market cap tokens
ExchangesLicensed onshore
exchange, some
regulated DEXs
Unlicensed offshore exchange, some unregulated DEXs
Features of
the Market
Lower returns, lower
volatility, safer and more
transparent, more
mature and stable
Higher returns, higher volatility, more opaque and risky, more innovation and opportunities
ComplementarityThe price rise of
mainstream coins
and the asset
appreciation will
bring overflowing
liquidity, which
can still drive the
price of small
and medium-sized
coins in the
non-compliant
ecosystem.
A more flexible and open environment nurtures new opportunities, and as small and medium-sized coins gradually grow, some will enter the compliant ecosystem.

coexistence and interdependence of compliant and non-compliant ecosystems

Such a coexistence pattern already exists today, but the influence of the compliant ecosystem in the crypto world is still relatively small. As the regulatory framework becomes clearer, the influence and importance of the compliant ecosystem will become increasingly significant. The development of the compliant ecosystem will not only significantly increase the total scale of the entire crypto industry, but also "transfuse" a large amount of liquidity to the non-compliant ecosystem through the rise in prices of mainstream assets and resulting liquidity overflow.

💡 Large projects will become compliant, while smaller projects can remain in the non-compliant market and still enjoy the overflow of liquidity from the compliant market. The two markets will complement each other ecologically, proving that securities laws will not be the end of crypto.

Peace is More Important Than Victory

On the judicial side, the SEC vs Ripple case has yet to be settled, and the SEC vs Coinbase/Binance cases have just begun - the settling of these cases could take several years.

On the legislative side, since July, several crypto regulation bills have been submitted to both houses, including the Financial Innovation and Technology for the 21st Century Act, Responsible Financial Innovation Act, Crypto-Asset National Security Enhancement and Enforcement —— Historically, more than 50 crypto-related regulatory bills have been submitted to both houses, but we are still far from a clear legal framework.

Statistics on the passing rate of bills in the US House of Representatives throughout history. On average, Congress receives about 7,000 bill submissions each year, with about 400 being enacted. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics

Statistics on the passing rate of bills in the US House of Representatives throughout history. On average, Congress receives about 7,000 bill submissions each year, with about 400 being enacted. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics

The worst outcome for the crypto industry is not that most tokens will eventually be classified as securities, but the loss of time and space for the industry to grow, and the waste of resources and opportunities, due to the long-term lack of a clear regulatory framework.

The escalation and intensification of conflicts between regulators and the crypto industry is good news, as it means that resolution is nearing.

The verdict for Ripple Labs was announced on July 13, and the next day, July 14, is the anniversary of the French Revolution. This reminds me of the unrest in France after the revolution; but it was also during that chaotic time that the foundation of modern law - the French Civil Code - was born. I hope that we can see that, although the crypto industry is currently experiencing chaos and turmoil, it will eventually find its direction and way out, establishing a set of norms and codes that can coexist harmoniously with the outside world.

Code civil des Français


📎 Phoenix Capital Management is a fundamental-driven cryptocurrency hedge fund. The founding team has held key positions in several multi-billion dollar hedge funds. We strive to use a rigorous and scientific methodology, combining top-down macro research with bottom-up industry insights, to capture structural investment opportunities in the cryptocurrency industry and create long-term returns that transcend bull and bear cycles.

You can find all our writings here: Writings .

🤩 Hiring! We are actively searching for crypto researchers to join our team. If you are interested, please send your resume to [email protected]. Details can be found here.


Disclaimer:

This content is for informational use only and is not intended as financial or legal advice.

Any mistakes or delays in this information, and any resulting damages, are not the responsibility of the author. Please be aware that this information may be updated without notice.

This content does not promote or recommend the purchase or sale of any financial instruments or securities discussed.

The author may hold positions in the securities or tokens discussed in this content.