Context Length Is a Security Boundary, Not Just a Cost Line
Most teams treat the context window as a budget. You have a million tokens; spend them wisely; longer conversations cost more and run slower. That framing is correct and incomplete. The context window is also an attack surface, and its size is a dial that quietly weakens your safety controls as it turns up.
Here is the failure mode nobody puts in the threat model. Your system prompt — the one with the guardrails, the tool-use rules, the "never do X" clauses — sits at the very top of the context. Its authority is strongest there. As a conversation runs, thousands of tokens of user turns, tool outputs, and retrieved documents pile on top of it. The model's attention does not weigh all of those tokens equally. The instructions closest to the point of generation win ties. By turn forty, your guardrails are not gone, but they are buried, and a patient adversary does not need a clever jailbreak to get past them. They just need a conversation long enough.
This is not a hypothetical. It is a measurable property of how transformers attend to long contexts, and it has a name in the research literature even if it does not have one in your incident review template.
